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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Constitutionality of Statutes Licensing
Occupations
It has now been eighteen years since this Law Review published an
article entitled Haphazard Regin.entation Under Licensing Statutes.'
This article criticised the practice of using licensing as a device to regu-
late professions, trades, and other such occupations when no substantial
relation to the police power could be demonstrated. The recent decision
in Roller v. Allen2 holding the licensing of tile contractors 3 unconstitu-
tional as an improper exercise of the police power makes timely a review
of recent developments of the North Carolina law in this field.
In 1938, when the above article was written, there were fifty-three
statutes providing for the licensing of occupations. 4 Some of these
statutes, such as those regulating doctors, 5 lawyers, 6 and dentists,7 were
and still are considered by all authorities to be well within the scope
of the police powers." Other statutes, such as those applying to barbers9
and cosmetologists'0 (beauty operators), were often questioned but gen-
erally have been accepted by the courts." However, the article took a
skeptical view as to whether any public purpose warranted the licensing
of such occupations as photography, dry cleaning, and tile contracting.' 2
The writers of this article also pointed out that this entire system
of regulation by licensing was springing up in a haphazard, piecemeal
fashion. The licensing statutes differed in such important matters as
the powers of the boards to make regulations, the extent of the judicial
review afforded a person whose license was revoked, and the extent of
the punishment provided for operating without a license. These serious
inconsistencies at least partly resulted from special interest groups "pres-
suring" for the adoption of their own drafts of proposed legislation. The
1 Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17
N. C. L. Rav. 1 (1938).
"245 N. C. 516, 96 S. E. 2d 851 (1957).
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-28 to -38 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
'See Hanft and Hamrick, supra note 1, at 2.
* N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-1 to -21 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
N. C. GEa. STAT. §§ 84-15 to -38 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-22 to -48 (1950 and Supp 1955).
8 11 Am. JuR., Constitutional Law, § 289 (1937).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 86-1 to -25 (1950 and Supp. 1955).10N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 88-1 to -29 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
117 Am. JUR., Barbers and Beauty Specialists, § 2 (1937) states that the courts
are generally agreed that barbers and beauty specialists may be regulated in the
interests of the public health and welfare, but there is a wide divergence in the
allowable extent of this regulation.
12 Hanft and Hamrick, supra note 1, at 3-8.
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article presented this challenge: "Squarely on the legislature rests the
responsibility to choose whether we are to have a policy of licensing
ordinary occupations. If such a policy is adopted it is time for orderly,
consistent, systematic development of such a policy. If we are to have
regimentation, let us at least have better regimentation."'
The legislature recognized the wide difference in the practices of these
examining boards and in 1947 passed Resolution 31 which called on the
Governor to appoint a commission of five members to study the prob-
lem.14 In 1953, after approximately fifteen years of receiving reports
and recommendations dealing with uniform administrative procedure,
the General Assembly adopted the present far-reaching legislation.'5
This legislation consisted of an act setting out a uniform procedure for
.most of the licensing boards of the state,'" and an act to provide for
judicial review of certain decisions made by administrative agencies other
than licensing boards.1 7
A stricter attitude toward the licensing of occupations appeared in
the North Carolina decisions. In 1940 in State v. Harris'8 the court
held the licensing of dry cleaners to be unconstitutional, stating that:
"[T]he rule will still hold good that regulation of a business or occupa-
tion under the police power must be based on some distinguishing feature
in the business itself or in the manner in which it is ordinarily conducted,
the natural and probable consequence of which, if unregulated, is to pro-
duce substantial injury to the public peace, health, or welfare."' 9
Nine years later the court in State v. Ballance20 overruled a former
decision 2 1 which had sustained the licensing of photographers, and held
this to be unconstitutional. Again the court emphasized lack of con-
nection between the occupation licensed and the objects of the police
power, namely health, order, morals, safety, and general welfare.
This year in Roller v. Allen the court struck down the licensing of
tile contractors. Here the court sets forth the following guide for the
legislature:
"From what this Court has said, in the cases cited, it may be
concluded that the police power in seeking to extend its field of
control, must not invade personal and property rights guaranteed
and protected by Article I, Sections 1, 7, 17 and 31 of the Con-
13 Id. at 18.
See Statutory Changes, 25 N. C. L. REv. 376, 377-79 (1947).
See, for a discussion of the changes accomplished, Statutory Changes, 31
N. C. L. Rzv. 375, 378-85 (1953).
'
0 N. C. GEN. STAr. §§ 150-9 to -34 (Supp 1955).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (Supp. 1955).
18216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1940).
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 758, 6 S. E. 2d 854, 863 (1940).229 N. C. 764, 51 S. E. 2d 731 (1949).
21 State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
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stitution of North Carolina. The Act in question here has as its
main and controlling purpose not health, not safety, not morals,
not welfare, but a tight control of tile contracting in perpetuity
by those already in the business....
"This Court, in the cases cited, has surveyed and marked the
dividing line betweeen the professions and skilled trades which
in the public interest permit of regulation by licensing under the
police power, and those ordinary lawful and innocuous occupa-
tions and trades which are protected from regulation by consti-
tutional guarantees. The occupations and trades in the latter
category constitute off-limits ground on which trespassing in for-
bidden by the Constitution. The police power of the State must
stop at the line." 22
The decision is a far reaching one because it was made despite the fact
that the tile contractor involved had failed to pass the examination and
there was evidence that he had been discharged on one job for unsatis-
factory work, and evidence that tile contracting required special skill,
and despite the lower court's conclusion that the licensing act was reason-
able and necessary to prevent fraud and incompetence, and to promote
public health.
While the court has eliminated some of the licensing statutes on
constitutional grounds, the legislature has added others. Some of the
acts appear to be on sound constitutional ground. Practical nurses,23
dispensing opticians,24 and physical therapists 25 are all in occupations
which have a substantial relation to the public health. Other occupations
recently subjected to licensing have a questionable connection with the
public purposes included in the police power. This group includes scale
mechanics 26 and refrigeration contractors. 27  Finally, it can be argued
that the act licensing motor vehicle dealers 28 has no substantial relation
to the police power. The act states that one of its primary purposes is
"... to prevent frauds, impositions and other abuses upon its [North
Carolina's] citizens."29  The opinion in State v. Harris would seem to
"
2Roller v. Allen, 245 N. C. 516, 525, 96 S. E. 2d 851, 859 (1957).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-171.1 to -171.12 (1950 and Supp. 1955) adopted in
1947.
24N . C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-234 to -255 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1951; Statutory
Changes, 29 N. C. L. REv. 352, 360-65 (1951).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-256 to -270 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1951.
26'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 81-52 to -58 (1950) adopted 1941; see, Statutory
Clumges, 19 N. C. L. REv. 435, 447-49 (1941) for critical comment.
21N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-52 to -64 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1955; Statutory
Changes, 33 N. C. L. REv. 513, 520-21 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 to -308 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1951. Licensing
statutes for automobile dealers and various provisions of such statutes are discussed
in Note, 5 OHio ST. L. J. 377 (1939).
-' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (Supp. 1955).
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render it doubtful whether this act will be declared constitutional on the
basis of preventing fraud. The court quoted from a Kentucky decision
involving licensing of real estate brokers as follows:
"'If occasional opportunity for fraud is to be the test, then
there is no reason why every grocer, every merchant, every auto-
mobile dealer, every keeper of a garage, every manufacturer, and
every mechanic who deals more frequently with the public in gen-
eral, and whose opportunities for fraud are far greater than those
of a real estate agent or salesman, may not be put on the same
basis. . . . In our opinion, the right to earn one's daily bread
cannot be made to hang on so narrow a thread. Broad as is the
police power, its limit is exceeded when the State undertakes
to require moral qualifications of one who wishes to engage or
continue in a business which, as usually conducted, is no more
dangerous to the public than any other ordinary occupation of
life.' ,0 (Emphasis added.)
The court in cases including Roller v. Allen has now clearly estab-
lished that there is a large category of innocuous occupations the licens-
ing of which will not come within the police power of the state. This
attitude, combined with the growing public awareness of the situation,
should result in better considered and more appropriate licensing legis-
lation in the future.
HERBERT T. MITCHELL, JR.
Bankruptcy-International Jurisdictional Problems Arising Between
the United States and Canada
Since World War II there has been an expanding international de-
velopment in the economy of the United States.' This will give rise to
a problem which has been little considered heretofore :2 the bankruptcy
of an individual or corporation engaged in international operations. Since
it is with Canada that our most important economic expansion has
taken place,3 this paper will seek to point out some of the jurisdictional
30 State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 761, 6 S. E. 2d 854, 864 (1940) quoting from
Rawls v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 292, 279 §. W. 350 (1925).
1 "Since the war, total investments in new foreign plants and facilities amounted
to more than $12 billion, or more than 170% of the investment at the end of World
War II." THE AMERICANA, Foreign Investments 267 (Annual 1956).
2 "Probably in no branch of the law is information in foreign law lacking to such
a degree as in the matter of bankruptcy.. . ." Nadelmann, Recognition of American
Arrangements Abroad, 90 U. PA. L. R1v. 780, 783 (1942).
1 "Canada continued as the most important area for new direct investments, with
an indicated volume of $600 million during 1955, two thirds of which was new
United States capital.... As a result, American direct investments in that country
(Vol. 35
